Slovak Academy of Sciences, Institute of State and Law, Bratislava, Slovak Republic[1]
Within the European Union, the Slovak Republic represents a space that is exceptionally vulnerable to the effects of hoaxes, propaganda, and foreign influence operations. This vulnerability is not merely hypothetical; it is quantifiable and has real consequences for democratic processes and social cohesion. Surveys repeatedly confirm a high level of belief in conspiracy theories and disinformation narratives. According to data from 2022, up to 54% of respondents in Slovakia believe in conspiracy theories, such as the world being controlled by secret elites.[2] This situation is amplified by a widespread sense of threat from external actors, whether it be liberal democracy, Western societies, or migrants. The historical narrative of an oppressed nation further deepens distrust in institutions and creates fertile ground for alternative explanations of reality. Since 2022, Slovakia has become a focal point for influence operations with an intensity it has never faced before.
Slovak law does not provide a clear or universally accepted legal definition of “disinformation.” However, certain types of harmful content—such as false information (e.g. hoaxes) capable of endangering public health or national security—may fall under criminal or administrative regulation.[3] The Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic, in its decision III. ÚS 288/2017, distinguishes between disinformation and falsehoods. In its decision PL. ÚS 26/2019 concerning a moratorium on the publication of public opinion polls, a distinction is made between disinformation and purposeful information. In this decision, the Constitutional Court also points to the absence of a legal definition of disinformation.
Slovak law does not contain an explicit legal definition of “hate speech” either. It addresses such actions through criminal law provisions prohibiting incitement to hatred, defamation of a nation, race or belief, and support of extremist groups.[4]
Hence, given Slovakia’s legal landscape, there is no single, comprehensive legal framework explicitly defining disinformation or hate speech. This means that Slovak legislation generally does not make specific distinctions between online and offline disinformation or hate speech in terms of their core definitions. Instead of explicit definitions, Slovak law addresses these issues through various provisions in the Criminal Code and other laws, focusing on the harmful effects or content regardless of the medium.
More recently, specific measures were introduced to address online disinformation, such as the National Security Authority’s power to block websites disseminating harmful content, particularly in the context of national security threats.
Relevant offences sanctioned in the Criminal Code of Slovakia include:
From among the above, the key offences include:
These offences typically carry a penalty of imprisonment, with duration varying by the specific crime. For instance, Section 423 of the Criminal Code specifies a penalty range of 1 to 3 years.
There are additionally aggravating circumstances such as: Committing the crime in a state of emergency, Crime motivated by extremist ideology or racism, Crime affecting a large audience (e.g., public broadcast or online dissemination)
Since Slovakia has faced a sharp increase in hate speech in the online space in recent years. The Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic is currently introducing a legislative initiative aimed at enabling a more effective fight against the spread of hatred and fear, as well as threats, ridicule, and the humiliation of individuals or social groups. The Minister announced that he will propose a new legal definition of an offence of hate speech.[5]
Administrative law also allows for sanctions against the media and broadcasting content that violates ethical or legal standards. The Council for Media Services can impose penalties for failure to prevent or remove hateful content. The penalties include fines, suspension of broadcast licenses, and imprisonment.
In addition, Civil law allows individuals to seek protection of personality rights (e.g., under Civil Code § 11-13), including monetary compensation for non-material harm.
Key authorities which are responsible for enforcing laws on disinformation and hate speech in Slovakia are the following: Police of the Slovak Republic, Prosecutors Office, Council for Media Services, National Security Authority and the Office for Combating Organized Crime.
To identify and investigate potential cases, the authorities use public reports, monitoring of online platforms and they cooperate with media regulators.
The National Security Authority (NBÚ) is specifically authorized to temporarily block harmful online content, particularly in cases involving cybersecurity threats or hybrid information warfare. Still, there is a significant implementation gap: The NBÚ’s temporary blocking competence was used only once, after the attack of Russia on Ukraine. The NBÚ lost its competence to block disinformation sites after September 2022. However, as of October 2022 the NBÚs legal power was partially restored, but without being applied in practice.
The Council for Media Services (RPMS) supervises audiovisual platforms and may impose administrative sanctions for disinformation or hate speech in broadcast and on-demand content. However, platforms frequently respond slowly or insufficiently to moderation requests, especially during elections (e.g., only half of flagged hate speech takedowns were processed).
Until august 2024, the National Unit for Combating Extremism and Cybercrime (part of National criminal agency – NAKA) was the specialized police body dealing with online hate and extremism. In august 2024, this unit was dissolved, and its competences were redistributed between the Office for Combating Organized Crime (ÚBOK), the National Anti-Drug Unit, and the Counter-Terrorism Centre. Between January and May 2025, over 500 cases related to the criminal offence of “spreading alarming news” (§ 361 of the Criminal Code) were identified. Many of these cases are still under investigation.[6]
Under Slovak domestic legislation law (Media Services Act No 264/2022, in addition to EU DSA obligations), video-sharing and on-demand platforms established in Slovakia must identify and remove hate speech, disinformation, and other “harmful content” in Slovak language. They also implement age verification, ensure local-language content moderation, and provide transparency on moderation and political advertising.[7]
Slovakia thereby follows the “notice-and-action” model. Platforms are not liable for user content unless notified of illegality. Once notified—by citizens, authorities, or RPMS—they must act promptly under the Act (and EU’s Digital Services Act) to remove or block the content.
Slovakia thereby supports the principle “what is illegal offline should also be illegal online”, while suggesting that the rule should apply not only to illegal content but also to goods and services offered on internet, as those should be subject to the same regulations and standards as goods and services sold in regular shops.[8]
The most significant court decisions shaping the interpretation of disinformation or hate speech laws in Slovakia include the following:
Milan Mazurek v. Slovakia: The Supreme Court upheld conviction of a Member of Parliament for anti-Roma hate speech
Tibor Rostas case: An editor of a journal was convicted for publishing anti-Semitic narratives in his magazine
Both Mazurek and Rostas cases set precedents for applying hate speech laws to public figures. The courts thereby applied the principle of proportionality in light of Article 26 of the Constitution of Slovakia and ECtHR case law. They weighed societal harm against freedom of expression, upholding restrictions of the freedom of speech when speech is abused for incitement or denial of crimes.
In the complex ecosystem of the media environment in Slovakia, there is a multi-level system that seeks to regulate and cultivate both online and offline spaces. This system combines legal regulation with self-regulatory initiatives created by the actors themselves in the media market. In the fight against the negative phenomena of disinformation and hate speech, not only state institutions but also self-regulatory mechanisms and civil society activities play a key role. The most important bodies and initiatives in Slovakia include the Print and Digital Council of the Slovak Republic[9] , the Advertising Council[10] and the Code of Practice against the Spread of Disinformation[11] , supplemented by the activities of several non-governmental organizations.
The Print and Digital Council of the Slovak Republic acts as the main self-regulatory body for journalistic ethics. It brings together publishers of print and digital media who have committed themselves to complying with the Code of Ethics for Journalists. The public can contact the council with complaints about content they consider unethical, including hate speech or gross factual errors that could be part of disinformation narratives. The Print and Digital Council of the Slovak Republic assesses whether there has been a violation of the code and issues opinions. Its main goal is to improve journalism and protect the public from unethical content. Within the scope of the Optional Protocol to the Code of Ethics for Journalists on the Protection of Human Dignity, Humanity, and Minors, the Media Services Council forwards complaints/suggestions of violations of the provisions of the Media Services Act to the Association for the Protection of Journalistic Ethics as a self-regulatory body, whose executive body is the Print and Digital Council of the Slovak Republic, which oversees compliance with the Optional Protocol.
The Advertising Council is a self-regulatory body in the field of advertising. It ensures that advertising is ethical, truthful and in accordance with the Code of Ethical Principles of Advertising Practice. Although its primary focus is not directly on combating disinformation, its activities are relevant in cases where misleading or deceptive information, or even hateful elements, appear in commercial communications. The public and companies can file complaints about advertisements they consider unethical.
The Code of Practice on Disinformation is the first tool of its kind through which relevant industry players agreed on self-regulatory standards to combat disinformation in 2018. The process of revising the Code began in June 2021 and culminated in its signing and presentation on June 16, 2022. At that time, the Code was signed by 34 signatories. It includes very large platforms (YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, TikTok, Twitter, and LinkedIn) and very large online search engines (Google and Bing), but also smaller platforms (e.g., Twitch and Vimeo), research organizations (e.g., Avaaz, Globsec, Global Disinformation Index), fact-checkers (e.g. Maldita.es) and civil society organizations (e.g. Reporters Without Borders). The aim of the Code of Practice on Disinformation is to work with platforms, research organizations, and other signatories to effectively counter the spread of dangerous disinformation in the online space. As the long-standing leader of the European Regulators Group for Audiovisual Media Services working group on disinformation, the Media Services Council worked closely with all those committed to complying with the Code in its development. The Code aims to empower users, make necessary data available for research, and significantly increase the transparency of technology companies in the area of content moderation.
The fight against hate speech and disinformation would not be complete without initiatives from the third sector. There are several projects and organizations in Slovakia dedicated to fact-checking, increasing media literacy, and actively debunking hoaxes:
The Slovak legal system lacks a unified and explicit legal definition of “disinformation,” a point also noted by the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic. The European Commission understands this term as verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented, and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public. The National Security Authority (NBÚ) distinguishes between disinformation (intentionally spread false information with the intent to harm), misinformation (unintentionally spread false information), and malinformation (the dissemination of true information with the intent to harm). The impact of these phenomena was evident during the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the 2023 parliamentary elections, when sophisticated methods such as deepfake videos of political leaders and the spread of false intelligence reports emerged with the aim of influencing the credibility of the elections. On the one hand, the Slovak Republic has modern, EU-harmonized regulatory tools, such as the Media Services Act and the Publications Act, on the other hand the Slovak Republic’s response to this complex threat is characterized by its fragmentation. Instead of a unified, centrally coordinated strategy, there is a mosaic of tools scattered across criminal law, media regulation, and cybersecurity legislation. This approach is not only reactive but, above all, critically weakened by the absence of political consensus and, in some cases, by the active legitimization of disinformation by political elites.
[1] The blog is an outcome of the research project “22420166, Internet Blocking in the V4 Countries: Analyzing and Developing Procedural Safeguards”, financed by the Visegrad Fund. The Authors express their thanks to Ondrej Kobyda, a student from the Faculty of Law of the Trnava University in Trnava, for collecting and organizing the information used in this blog post.
[2] https://www.globsec.org/what-we-do/press-releases/globsec-trends-2022-vacsina-ludi-na-slovensku-stale-veri-konspiraciam
[3] See dissemination of false alarming news (Section 361 of the Criminal Code).
[4] Defamation of nation, race, and belief (Section 423); Incitement to national, racial, and ethnic hatred (Section 424) These provisions apply whether harmful speech occurs in person, in print, or online.
[5] https://www.minv.sk/?tlacove-spravy-2&sprava=pripravujeme-zakon-proti-sireniu-nenavisti-na-internete-inspirovany-nemeckom-a-rakuskom
[6] https://www.minv.sk/?statistika-kriminality-v-slovenskej-republike-za-rok-2025
[7] https://www.culture.gov.sk/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Act-No.-264_2022-Coll.-on-media-services-and-amending-certain-acts-Media-Services-Act-1.pdf
[8] https://visegradinfo.eu/index.php/collaborative/595-visegrad-four-want-to-distinguish-between-illegal-and-harmful-content-in-digital-services-act
[11] https://rpms.sk/kodex-postupov-proti-sireniu-dezinformacii
[12] https://www.hoaxyapodvody.sk/
[16] https://www.gerulata.com/
[18] https://www.facebook.com/groups/somtu/?locale=sk_SK
[19] https://www.facebook.com/people/Slovensk%C3%AD-elfovia/100063976065983/